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Abstract 
 
In developing countries, empirical evidence suggests that labor unions entail a 
positive wage gap for unionized workers, in particular in monopolistic and 
publicly controlled firms. In this paper, we analyze how the presence of a labor 
union affects the regulation of a monopoly under asymmetric information. Since 
part of the informational rent left to the monopolistic firm benefits to the 
syndicate, we prove that the regulator is induced to lower the rent when the 
union has a large bargaining power. The net consumers' surplus can either 
increase or decrease with the firm's bargaining power depending on the firm's 
efficiency type. 
 
JEL classification: D42, D82, J51 
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 1.Introduction 
 
   In less developed countries (LDCs), it is well recognized that a barrier to development 
stems from inefficiencies in the public sector because of excessive labor redondancy. As a 
consequence, movements of liberalization and privatization such as those occurring in African 
countries during the nineties constitute important reforms that should improve the efficiency 
of the public sector. This process of restructuration is always conducted within the framework 
inherited from developed countries. Indeed, statements concerning public reforms in LDCs 
rely on inferences from theoretical models inspired by the new regulatory economics and also 
on inferences from empirical studies conducted in developed countries. However, the 
particular findings from the study of developed economies are unlikely to extend to the case 
of developing economies, because of the different political and institutional contexts. 
      
        Thus, in the design of optimal regulatory policies, it is important to amend existing 
theoretical models to account for some particular circumstances of developing 
countries.Curiously, as noted by Laffont (2001), problems in the theory of regulation for 
developing countries have received little attention. An important feature in LDCs concerns the 
lack of information suffered by regulators. Large firms have private information about their 
efficiency type, so that the regulator is forced to leave informational rent to discipline the 
firms and provide them with incentives to reveal their true type. While the consequences of 
asymmetric information on optimal contracts are now well established (see Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993), the significant role of labor unions has been neglected by economists in their 
theoretical analyses of restructuring the public sector.  
      
      The main objective of labor unions is to raise the wages of workers that they represent,so 
that unions are often identified as monopolies. Since the level of wage is higher with unions, 
such wage-making activities are more likely to persist in the long run when firms possess 
some monopolistic feature
1
. Across countries, it is well known that monopolistic product 
markets are most hospitable to unionism, whether the monopolies are private or public. 
Clearly, as one focuses on situations where unions share monopolistic rents with firms, these 
effects tend to be higher in public sector labor markets (see the discussion in Pencavel, 1997). 
                                                 
1
 On the role of product market power on unionization, see among others Layard er alii (1991). 
Since union membership of public sector workers usually exceeds that of private sector 
workers, it seems important to account for the role of unionization when implementing 
regulatory contract in developing countries. 
 
      It is often claimed that the levels of unionism are different in developed and less 
developed countries. Since unions mainly concerns employees and since a large fraction in 
LDCs are self-employed or participate in family activities, lower levels of unionism are 
expected in such countries. Labor unions are concentrated in the formal sector : workers 
concerned by collective bargaining are more likely to be employed by the public sector and by 
large private sector firms (see Pencavel, 1997). Clearly, monopolistic and publicly-controlled 
firms are mostly concerned by the implementation of regulatory contracts. Two stylized facts 
characterize the importance of unionism in developing countries. 
 
        First, the participation of workers in labor union is not uncommon. According to the data 
collected by the World Bank, union rates are generally comprised between 10 and 30 percents 
for non-agricultural workers
2
. Of course, unionization rates strongly differ among countries, 
and they are affected by the level of economic development and also by the legal framework 
of collective bargaining. Second, recent empirical evidence outlines the power of labor unions 
in poor countries, with a significant wage premium for unionized workers (see Schultz and 
Mwabu, 1998, Teal, 1996, Velenchik, 1997). While a few studies exhibit a negative wage 
gap, most recent analyses from microeconomic surveys suggest that the impact of 
unionization on wages is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Some 
authors obtain a positive wage gap that is less than 10 percent (MacIssac and Rama, 1997, 
Owoye, 1994, Velenchik, 1997), but the most frequent conclusion is a unionization wage 
premium with a magnitude of about 20 percents (Bhattacherjee and Chaudhuri, 1994, Moll, 
1993, Schultz and Mwabu, 1998, Standing, 1992). 
       
       Despite the significant impact of unionization in developing countries, previous issues in 
the theory of regulation have failed to account for the presence of labor unions. Thus, the aim 
of the present paper is to extend the analysis of regulation models with asymmetric 
information in order to account for unionization. For that purpose, we draw on the case of the 
regulation of a monopolist with unknown costs (Baron and Myerson, 1982).  
                                                 
2
 Detailed results ara available at www.worldbank.org; see also Upham (1995). 
      When a firm has better information regarding its costs than the regulator, the optimal 
regulatory policy satisfies the constraint that the firm is induced to report truthfully the 
information desired by the regulator. Thus, a feasible regulatory policy that maximizes social 
welfare entails a welfare loss due to informational asymmetry. To prevent the firm from 
misrepresenting its costs, the optimal regulatory price depends on the regulator information 
about the firm's costs (Guesnerie and Laffont, 1984). The regulatory price is generally higher 
than the firm's marginal costs and it may exceed the unregulated monopoly price
3
. Also, the 
optimal subsidy left to the monopolistic firm may either increase or decrease with the level of 
costs announced by the firm, while the firm's expected profit is always a decreasing function 
of the firm's cost parameter. 
    
       Since unionism affects the wage levels and then the cost structures of firms, it is also 
expected to modify the characterization of the optimal regulatory contract. A fraction of the 
optimal subsidy from the regulator benefits to the syndicate. We present an extended 
framework that encompasses two stylized facts of labor markets, namely the lack of 
information suffered by regulators and the presence of labor unions. This type of theoretical 
reasoning operates satisfactorily for drawing inferences about labor markets in developing 
economies. We focus on the problem of how to regulate a unionized monopoly in a setting of 
asymmetric information. By accounting for a labor union that bargains efficiently with a 
monopolistic firm, we prove that unionized workers receive a fraction of the regulatory 
transfer through higher salaries. It follows that the optimal price decreases with the bargaining 
power of the monopoly, whose effect on the consumers' surplus may be either positive or 
negative depending on the efficiency type of the firm.  
 
    The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the basic model in section 2 
and examine how the informational rent is shared between the firm and the labor union. In 
section 3, we characterize the optimal regulatory contract and discuss its main properties. 
Concluding comments are in section 5.  
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 In that case, the supermonopoly price is a punishment less severe than the shut-down solution, since the 
regulated price still generates some consumers’s surplus ( Baron and Myerson, 1982). 
1. A Model of a Unionized Monopoly 
 
        We now consider the problem of how to regulate a monopolistic firm with unknown 
costs and whose workers are all members of a labor union. Our purpose is to characterize the 
corresponding optimal regulatory contract using the theory of ncentives contracting. To 
analyze the consequences of asymmetric information on the firm's efficiency parameter, we 
proceed in the following way. First, conditional on the expected subsidy provided by the 
regulator to the firm, we calculate the expected utilities both for the monopoly and the labor 
union. Second, given the previous rents, we derive the optimal mechanism that induces a 
truthful report and characterize the price and transfer of the optimal contract. For the 
presentation, we successively outline the decisions for the monopolistic firm and for the union 
and study the result of the bargaining between the two parties. The optimal policy and its 
properties are derived in the next section. 
 
      Let us consider a firm which produces a single homogenous good and is characterized by 
a monopolistic position on the market. We rely on a static framework and we assume without 
loss a generality that the level of technology is fixed. It follows that the production function 
for the monopoly is defined over only one variable factor. Denoting by L  the quantity of 
labor, the production function for the firm is expressed as 
4
 : 
                                                    

L
LQ                                                                             (1) 
where  LQ  is the level of output realized by the firm, and    corresponds to the 
productivity of labor. This cost parameter is an indicator of the firm's performance. In 
particular, a more efficient firm is characterized by a lower value for the parameter  .While 
the production function  

L
LQ   is common knowledge, the productivity parameter   is 
only known privately to the firm. The cost structure is not known to the regulator, but we 
assume that the regulator has some subjective prior probability distribution for the unknown 
parameter  . Unless otherwise, the parameter   can take on any value in the closed interval  
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 Following Laffont and Tirole (1986), one can extend our analysis by considering a general  production function 
of the form 
 
0', 

 f
ef
L
Q

with e a level of effort which decreases the marginal costs which is 
 , but leads to similar qualitative results. 
  , , with   . The parameter   is modeled as the realization of a random 
variable with distribution )(F  and corresponding density )(f  defined over the support . 
We make the following assumption concerning the cumulative distribution function )(F . 
 
Assumption 1 
 
 
0
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
 f
F
d
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This may be seen as a decreasing returns assumption, and the monotone hazard rate for 
)(F  is a condition satisfied by the most standard distributions (Laffont and Tirole, 1993)5. 
 
    Now, let us denote by  LTV ,  the utility function of the monopolistic firm. The utility 
level  LTV ,  depends on the subsidy received from the planner and on the payment of 
salaries. If we denote by T  the monetary transfer paid to the  firm by the regulator, the utility 
function for the monopoly is given by : 
 
                                wLTLTV ,                                             (2) 
 
 where wL  are incomes paid to workers. We assume that the monopoly does not face any 
fixed costs, so that production costs are simply equal to labor costs. Hence, the marginal 
production cost is constant and equalized with the wage rate. In our setting, it is important to 
note that the wage rate w  is the result of a bargaining between the monopolistic firm and the 
labor union. 
 
     Let us describe the behavior of the syndicate. There are two key assumptions for our 
problem. First, there exists only one labor union for the monopolistic firm. Second, all the 
workers of the firm are members of the labor union. It follows that the decisions of the 
syndicates emanate from one representative unionized agent, whose aim is to improve labor 
conditions in the workplace. As usual in the economic theory of trade union behavior, we 
assume that the union cares about its members' wages w   and the level of employment in the 
firm w  (see Oswald, 1985).  
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 For instance, the monotone hazard rate is satisfied for uniform, normal, logistic, exponential or chi-squared 
distributions. 
      Let  LwU ,  be a quasi-concave utility function for the union. Following Rosen (1970) 
and Calvo (1978), we rely on a specific structural form structural form and adopt the 
following functional form known as the rent utility
6
: 
 LwwU
o
                               (3) 
Where 
o
w is the reservation wage for the workers of the monopoly. It follows that the union 
aims to maximize its rent which is defined as the surplus income on top of the wage bill under 
perfect competition in the labor market. 
 
        The output is marketed by the firm and the demand function is supposed to be known by 
both the monopoly and the regulator. If we denote by  P  the inverse demand function, 
 QP  is the price at which the consumers demand the output Q  and the inequality 
  0' QP  holds. The private good provides the gross surplus  QS  for consumers such that  
   
Q
QdQPQS
0
~~
 , with   0' QS  and   0'' QS .The net consumer surplus is 
   QQPQS   Also, the subsidy T  made by the regulator to the monopoly can be raised 
only through a distortionary mechanism. It follows that the cost of redistributing public funds 
is  T1  , with 0  (see the discussion in Laffont and Tirole, 1986). 
 
       We can now turn to the planner's problem. The regulator has both consumer, producer 
and union surplus objectives. If we denote by W  the social level of well-being, the utilitarian 
planner seeks to maximize W such that : 
 
                                       UVTQSW   1                                          (4) 
 
     For political and ideological reasons, we assume that the regulator places a weight 
10   on the satisfaction of the trade union U . Under perfect information, the regulator 
would  solve : 
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 This utility is a special case of the Stone-Geary specification     21 
oo
LLwwU  , where
1
 and 
2
 indicate the relative importance of wage and employment to the union, and 
o
w and 
o
L are minimum 
acceptable levels of wage and employment (see MaCurdy and Pencavel, 1986). The rent utility function holds 
when 
1
 =
2
 =1/2 and 
o
L =0.  
                             Max      UVTQSW   1  
subject to the individual rationality constraint  :   0, LTV , meaning that the regulator 
cannot force the monopolistic firm to operate if it expects a negative profit. At the 
equilibrium, the marginal utility of the commodity  QS '  would be equated to the social 
marginal cost. However, in our context, the regulator cannot observe the productivity 
parameter   and we have to characterize the optimal mechanism based on the 
observability of the output level Q 7 . 
 
    When the regulator uses a feasible regulatory policy, the monopolistic firm is expected to 
receive a subsidy T  when reporting its productivity parameter  . Since the level of 
wage is the result of a bargaining between the firm and the union, we have to study how the 
regulatory transfer is shared between the two parties for a fixed amount T  before deriving the 
optimal policy. It follows that a specific model of bargaining has to be selected in order to 
find the ex post wage rate negotiated by the union with the firm. For our purpose, we focus an 
efficient bargain framework which generates a Pareto-optimal outcome for the two parties. 
 
       More precisely, we rely on the standard Nash cooperative solution to model how the 
wage is determined. Conditionally on the subsidy received from the planner, the firm and the 
labor union seek to maximize the following joint product  wN ) : 
                                           21 1  
oo
UUVVwN                                         (5) 
 
where 
o
V  and  
o
U are the minimum levels of satisfaction for the two parties. Without loss of 
generality, these two reservation payoffs are set to zero. Finally, the parameter  is an 
indicator of the relative importance of the firm and the union in the bargaining process. This 
framework allows us to characterize the equilibrium wage given the amount of subsidy T  
received from the social planner. 
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 In this paper, we consider a control mechanism based on the output because the input is not supposed 
observed.Further , Maskin ans Riley (1984) have shown the superiority of the relation based on the output level 
for a monopolist firm. 
Proposition 1: Under the equilibrium , the optimal wage expected by the firm is such that: 
                    
L
V
ww
o



1*
                                                                                           . 
 
Proof: 
Indeed , the optimal wage such that : 
       
L
V
wLwwwLTUUVVw
oooo

  
 1
 Max arg 1
11
w
*
 
(Q.E.D). 
 
       It follows that at the equilibrium, the wage is an increasing function of the firm's profit V  
and thus of the subsidy received from the planner since : 
                       0          ,, * 


T
wwLTLTV  
 
In addition, we note that the conditions of bargaining matter for the optimal wage. The 
expected wage is higher when the labor union is characterized by an important power in the 
decision process :  0     * 



w  . The receipt of an important wage from the firm leads in 
turn to an increase of the workers' rent since the derivative  0


w
U is positive. Now, we 
are in a position to indicate how the expected subsidy is shared between the firm and the 
union given the optimal wage. 
 
Corollary 1 Given the optimal expected wage 
*w , the expected utility levels are : 
i) for the firm ,    QwTV
o
   
ii) for the union ,       QwTU
o
  1              
                                    . 
Proof 
The utility function of the firm is: 
   LwTLTV *,  . Using the definition of  *w  and rearranging some terms, we deduce 
that    LwTLTV
o
, .Since  

L
LQ  , it follows that     QwTV
o
  .  
For the labor union characterized by  LwwU
o
 * , we easily obtain  


V
U  1   and 
thus     QwTU
o
  1 .                                  (QED) 
 
      The previous corollary characterizes the optimal rent respectively for the firm and the 
union. We remark that the rent of the regulated firm is an increasing function of its bargaining 
power. A dominant monopoly firm succeeds in setting low wages, and thus benefits from a 
higher level of satisfaction. Of course, this effect is magnified when the value of the 
productivity parameter is low   0' V . Conversely, when the weight of the union in the 
wage decision is important, the labor union receives a significant part of the firm's rent. In that 
case, the labor union may be seen as a secondary beneficiary: the benefits of the regulatory 
transfer are shifted in part to unionized workers through higher salaries. One observes a 
partial slide of the firm's rent over to the labor union.  
 
       We can now characterize the optimal contract between the social planner and the firm. 
Since the regulator is unable to observe the efficiency type of the firm and has only prior 
beliefs on the range of efficiency parameters and the associated distribution, the planner is 
constrained to make contracts menu contingent on the level of production. When 
implementing the optimal contract, the planner is forced to account for the partial slide of the 
benefit to the trade union 
 
3. The Optimal Regulatory Contract 
    
    We examine the regulator's problem, which is to design a compensation structure 
hatmaximizes the expected utility  V  of the monopolistic firm given the presence of the 
trade union and the bargaining over wages. 
 
    Using the literature on incentive contracting and the revelation principle, it is known that 
without loss of generality, one can restrict the search to the class of mechanisms that induces a 
truthful revelation of the productivity parameter   of the firm (see Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). In the context of our model, any optimal mechanism denoted by M  that induces a 
truthful reporting can be represented as the following two uple : 
                                                 TQM ,   
For each value of   announced by the monopolistic firm, the optimal contract defines 
the expected level of production  Q  and the subsidy  T  received from the regulator as 
a function of the report  . The regulator offers a menu of type-revealing contracts and 
the firm is expected to choose one of these self-selection contracts. 
 
    Considering a mechanism       TQM , , let   ,~V  be the net level of 
satisfaction that is achieved by a monopoly of type   if the firm chooses to report the 
type 
~ 8
. It follows that the rent   ,~V  can be expressed as : 
                      ,~          ,   ~~,~ QwTV
o
                                  (6) 
         
Finally denote by   ,V  the situation where the firm's utility is truthfully reported. Given 
asymmetric information, there are two constraints in the determination of the regulator's 
problem. First, the requirement of truthful reporting gives the following incentive 
compatibility constraint (IC) : 
                ,~                   ,~,   VV                                                   (7) 
Second, imposing the condition of individual rationality (IR), we can write : 
      ,~            0,VV                                                              (8) 
 
    In this setting, the regulator's fundamental  problem is given by the maximization of the  
expected social welfare      )1( UVTQSWE    given the distribution 
function  F  under both the incentive compatibility and the individual rationality 
constraints; 
     Let us solve this model of unionized monopoly given the asymmetric information on the 
Parameter  . To find the optimal level of output, we begin by characterizing the class of 
regulatory contracts that satisfies the incentive constraints in order to implement 
      TQM ,  in a dominant strategy. 
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 Let us recall that the reservation payoff of the monopolistic firm i s set to zero. 
Proposition 2.  The Contract       TQM ,  satisfies the incentive constraint if and 
only if : 
i)       


            dxxQwV
o
 
ii)                   0'Q                                                                      . 
 
Proof: 
From the definition of  V  such that: 
      




~
~~
 QwTMaxV
o
 
 V  is an upper envelope of linear function in  , theh it is convex and we have almost 
everywhere using the envelope theorem ,  : 
    0'   QwV
o
  and 
    0'''   QwV
o
 
The necessary condition for a maximum is         ,0'0''' QQwV
o
. 
Now, by integration of     QwV
o
' , such that   0V , we obtain9: 
      


            dxxQwV
o
 
which corresponds to the informational rent left to the type   of firm.(Q.E.D) 
 
      Because of asymmetric information about the firm's productivity parameter  , it 
follows that the regulator is forced to give up a costly rent to the monopolistic firm. The rent 
is used to discipline the firm into revealing its true efficiency type. In comparison, under 
symmetric information, the social planner would solve the problem of maximization of social 
welfare subject to the individual rationality constraint , so that the optimal subsidy satisfies 
    QwT
o
 and hence the rent for the monopoly is null. 
 
      Proposition 2 gives us two additional pieces of information about the informational rent. 
First, the rent value  V  received by the monopoly is a decreasing function of the efficiency 
                                                 
9
 The less efficient type of monopoly obtains no rent from the regulatory contract. 
parameter  . Hence, to be willing to reveal the firm's true type, the regulator must 
reward the lower  -type of firm with a more important rent value than the higher
 type. Second, using the monotonicity condition such that       , 0'Q  , it 
follows that an efficient monopoly characterized by a low value for   is induce to 
lessen its level of production in order to extract a higher rent value from the regulator
10
. 
      
        We now examine in greater detail the two components  T  and  Q  of the ptimal 
implemented contract       TQM , . For that purpose, we have to solve the 
regulator's problem whose aim is to maximize the expected level of social well-being )(WE  
such that : 
                   dFUVTQSWE )1()(  

                                   (9) 
     Let us begin by the calculation of the regulatory transfer  T . Since the firm's utility is 
defined by: 
        QwTV
o
  from corollary 1 and using the rent value  V  defined in 
proposition 2, we can express the optimal subsidy  T  as : 
        


            dxxQwQwT
oo
                                                (10) 
Now, again from proposition 2, we know that the following equality holds : 
   
 



V
U  1  
We deduce the optimal value for the rent of the labor union as a report of   : 
        


            1 dxxQwU
o
                                                            (11) 
 
      Finally, we insert both the transfer expression  T  and the optimal rents  V  and 
 U  in the expected social welfare function, which becomes accordingly : 
 
                                                 
10
 From the definition of the rent value, it is an increasing function of the produced  ouput  .Q .  
            


dFdxxQwQwQSWE
oo
)11()(  

 
By integration by parts , we obtain the following regulator’s problem , which is given by the 
maximization of the expected social welfare subject to the monotonicity contraint: 
          
 
 
   


 dFQ
f
F
wQwQSMax
oo
Q
)111(
(.)


 
s.t.        , 0'Q                                                                                               (13) 
  
 
Proposition 3  
 
Under asymmetric information , the optimal contract for the unionized monopoly is given by: 
i)          
 
 


f
F
wwQP
oo
 111  
ii)         


            dxxQwQwT
oo
                                               . 
 
Proof : 
Let us first ignore the monotonicity constraint       , 0'Q  and focus on the less 
constrained problem. Then, since    
Q
QdQPQS
0
~~
dx, we easily obtain the optimal level of 
output  by solving the equality  
 
0)( 


WE
Q 
 
Now, to show that the optimal contract also satisfies the monotonicity condition 
      , 0'Q , we define the function: 
            
 
 


f
F
wwQPQ
oo
 111,  
Thus we observe that the sign  
  






Q
signQ
,
 '  , it follows that: 
  




 Q,
      
 
 
)(111




f
F
d
d
ww
oo
 , hence we have : 
 
  
0
,
 ' 






Q
Q  by using assumption 1, so the monotonicity condition is satisfied 
for the optimal level of the produced output      , Q .   (Q.E.D) 
      Let us interpret the characterization of the optimal contract between the social planner and 
the monopolistic firm. At the equilibrium, the level of price is given by the sum of the 
marginal cost of production  
o
w1  and the marginal cost of the informational rent  
   
 
 


f
F
w
o
 11  . Clearly, the optimal price exceeds the social marginal cost 
and the role of the rent is to induce the firm to reveal its true type. Under asymmetric 
information, the level of output is lower than the first-best solution. The explanation 
concerning the distortion in      , Q  is that the imitation of inefficient types of firms 
by efficient monopolies is undesirable
11
. 
 
     How does the labor union influence the optimal contract ? Clearly, the regulator knows 
that part of the subsidy provided to the monopolistic firm is shifted to the labor union because 
of the bargaining over wages. Thus, the planner has to make its subsidy contingent on the 
decision power of the firm. 
 
Corollary 2  
The optimal price is a decreasing function of the bargaining power of the 
Monopolistic  firm. 
 
     From the optimal price, we obtain 
 
  
 
 
01
.






 f
F
w
P
o
. When the parameter 
  is important, which is a situation corresponding to a dominant firm in the bargaining, the 
optimal price is set at a low value still above the marginal cost of production and the level of 
output is important. Conversely, for a dominant labor union, the regulator modifies the 
intensity of the distortion by choosing a low level of production. In so doing, the regulator 
prevents from an eventual slide of the transfer's benefit over to the union. Reducing the 
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 When social planner chooses to reduce the level of the output, a monopolist firm of type   finds it less 
profitable to mimic the type  
~
. 
expected rent of the monopolistic firm is thus an efficient mechanism for avoiding the 
conversion of firm's transfer into union's benefit
12
 
 
      Finally, we can examine the effect of the parameter   on the different agents' situation. 
Since the level of production is an increasing function of the firm's bargaining power, it 
follows that the parameter    exerts a positive impact on the rent of the monopoly : 
 
      
 



   








            0
,
dx
xQ
wdxxQwV
d
d
oo
   (14) 
Conversely, when the firm’s decision power is modified, we cannot determine its effects  on 
the union’s utility. Indeed, we have: 
 
     
 



   








            
,
1 dx
xQ
wdxxQwU
d
d
oo
   (15) 
 
The situation for the consumers is clearer, but slightly more complex. In the context of our 
roblem, the consumers' surplus is affected by the regulation policy and it may either increase 
or decrease with the parameter   depending on the type of firm. 
 
Corollary 3    A rise in the firm's bargaining power leads to : 
i) a reduction of the consumers' surplus for an efficient type of firm( )   
ii) an increase of the consumers' surplus for an inefficient type of firm )(    
 
Proof.  
From the de_nition of the net surplus such that, 
          *1 TQSQS
n
  
we obtain the following derivative : 
         
 








 
 





dx
xQQ
wQSQS
on
,
11'  
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 When the parameter  is such that 1 , we note that the regulator is indifferent with respect to the 
distribution of the rent between the firm and the labot union.  
Now, given the definition of        QPQS '   from proposition 3, we get : 
      
 
 
 
 








 
 






dx
xQQ
f
F
QS
n
,
111  
which proves the announced result.                             (Q.E.D) 
 
 
        Let us interpret this result. With an efficient type of firm, the regulator expects a high 
level of production from the monopoly and this increases the gross consumers' surplus. But in 
that case, the regulator has also to compensate the firm with a more important amount of 
subsidy. The rise in the transfer value exceeds the rise in the consumer's surplus for an 
efficient monopolistic firm, which lowers the situation for consumers. Conversely, with an 
inefficient monopoly, the consumers' surplus is expected to go up. 
 
 
  4 Conclusion 
    When focusing on regulatory contracts, analyzing a conceptual framework that is more 
specifically concerned with developing countries is a purposeful task. Specifically, this paper 
develops a regulation model of a monopoly integrating both asymmetric information and 
unionization. Curiously, in the recent movement of public sector reforms in poor countries, 
especially in Africa, the potential role of labor unions as wage-making institutions has been 
widely neglected. Given the significant impact in the pr ocess of wage setting in poor 
countries, we examine the incidence of unionization on the characterization of optimal 
regulatory contracts. 
 
      Our main result is to show that the labor union captures part of the informational rent 
involved by asymmetric information. The union may be seen as a secondary recipient, and the 
size of the rent is an increasing function of the union's bargaining power. As a consequence, 
when setting the optimal contract, the regulator is induced to lower the rent when the union 
has a large bargaining power. The optimal price for the monopolistic market is reduced when 
the labor union is dominant in the bargaining. Also, a change in the firm's bargaining power 
may either exert a positive or negative effect on the net consumers' surplus. This depends on 
the firm's efficiency type, an inefficient production process leading to an increased consumers' 
surplus. Clearly, our theoretical analysis points out that accounting for the presence of a labor 
union greatly affects the characterization of the optimal regulatory policy. 
      
    A final comment concerns the enforcement of regulatory contracts for unionized 
monopolies. Indeed, there exist numerous examples of enforcement failures for regulatory 
contracts in poor countries (see Laffont, 2001). These low enforcement capabilities mainly 
result from insufficient financial and auditing resources and also from the corruption of 
enforcement institutions. While accounting for imperfect information suffered by regulators 
when regulating unionized monopolistic firms is particularly adapted to developing countries 
with the recent privatization and liberalization movement, it would also be useful to examine 
such regulatory contracts in the case of imperfect enforcement. 
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